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Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of 
Religious Freedom Restoration 
Martin S. Lederman 
introduction 
Almost every member of Congress voted to approve the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),1 a bill endorsed by an unprecedented 
coalition of dozens of religious and civil rights organizations spanning the 
political and ideological spectrum.2 President Clinton quipped at the signing 
ceremony that perhaps only divine intervention could explain such an unusual 
meeting of the minds: the establishment of “new trust” across otherwise 
irreconcilable “ideological and religious lines,” he remarked, “shows . . . that 
the power of God is such that, even in the legislative process, miracles can 
happen.”3  
The RFRA consensus was especially “miraculous” because the legislation 
addressed a deeply divisive question: whether and under what circumstances 
religious objectors should be exempt from generally applicable laws. RFRA’s 
supporters, both within and outside Congress, would surely have had sharp 
disagreements about many specific claims for religious exemptions to 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.). 
2. The House approved RFRA by voice vote without opposition, and only three Senators 
opposed the legislation. See 139 Cong. Rec. 26416 (1993) (Senate); 139 Cong. Rec. 27239-41 
(1993) (House). The “Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion” that lobbied in support of 
RFRA included 66 organizations, ranging from the Christian Legal Society, the Episcopal 
Church, and the National Association of Evangelicals to the American Civil Liberties  
Union, the American Humanist Association and Americans United for Separation of Church 
and State. See BAPTIST JOINT COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACT: 20 YEARS OF PROTECTING OUR FIRST FREEDOM 6, http://bjconline 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/RFRA-Book-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9QY-K98F] 
(reproducing a Letter from Oliver S. Thomas, Coalition Chair, to a Senator, October 20, 
1993) (listing organizations).  
3. Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2000 
(Nov. 16, 1993).  
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particular laws. Yet they coalesced around RFRA, which circumvented such 
disagreements at the retail level by codifying a “cross-cutting” statutory 
standard that judges would be required to apply to an undifferentiated and 
unknown array of future claims for exemptions to every generally applicable 
law in the land.  
RFRA’s operative language provides that if application of a law or 
regulation to a person “substantially burdens” her exercise of religion, the 
government must exempt that person from operation of the law, unless the 
government can demonstrate that denying such an exemption is the “least 
restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling governmental interest.”4 
Congress concluded that this “test,” “set forth in prior Federal court 
rulings”5—including the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause decisions in 
Sherbert v. Verner6 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 both of which RFRA invokes by 
name8—”is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious 
liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”9  
In 1997, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have constitutional 
authority to impose RFRA as a limit on state and local laws.10 RFRA continues 
to apply to all federal law, however. And in 2000 the same wide-ranging 
coalition of religious and civil rights groups reunited with President Clinton to 
help secure enactment of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA),11 which applies the RFRA “test” to two discrete areas of state 
law: land use regulation, and the treatment of prisoners and other persons 
confined in state-operated institutions. More than twenty states have also 
enacted their own “mini-RFRAs” that require religious exemptions to state and 
local laws under certain circumstances—sometimes using language similar or 
identical to that found in the federal RFRA.12 In yet other states, similar 
 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b). 
5. Id. § 2000bb-1(a)(5). 
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
7. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
9. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
10. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
11. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 804 (2000) (principally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et 
seq.). 
12. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 
S.D. L. REV. 466, 476-79 & 477 n.67 (2010); State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L 
CONF. STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal 
-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [http://perma.cc/NG2L-XM9E]. 
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religious exemption tests apply by virtue of judicial construction of state 
constitutions.13  
The broad, bipartisan consensus in favor of such “general,” cross-cutting 
religious accommodation statutes has persisted throughout the past 
generation.14 Yet the RFRA coalition is now fraying at the seams and is in 
danger of permanent disintegration. The immediate source of the schism is 
clear—namely, the recent RFRA challenges to the so-called “contraception 
mandate.” In those cases, dozens of employers and universities have claimed 
that RFRA entitles them to exemptions from the regulatory requirement, 
under the “preventive health services” provision of the Affordable Care Act,15 
that employee and student health insurance plans reimburse plan beneficiaries 
for the costs of most methods of contraception.16 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,17 the Supreme Court held that several 
closely held for-profit corporations were entitled to a RFRA exemption from 
that regulation because the executive agencies had at least one “less restrictive” 
way to further the government’s compelling interest in ensuring that the 
companies’ female employees (and employee dependents) would have 
affordable access to effective contraception. The agencies had not 
demonstrated, the Court reasoned, why they could not make available to those 
for-profit employers the same “accommodation” that the agencies had offered 
to religious nonprofit organizations. Pursuant to that accommodation, the 
insurance company that administers the plan reimburses beneficiaries for the 
costs of contraception, without any payment, administration, or other 
involvement by the objecting employer.18 
 
13. See Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott Walker, and Contraception: A Partial Account 
of Hobby Lobby’s Implications for State Law, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 104-05 n.75 (2015). 
14. To cite only the latest example, a wide array of amici, including many of the members of the 
“Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion” and the federal government, filed in support of 
a Muslim prisoner’s RLUIPA challenge to a state prison regulation in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. 
Ct. 853 (2015). See Holt v. Hobbs, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case 
-files/cases/holt-v-hobbs [http://perma.cc/YLB2-FJ8X] (listing amici and linking to briefs). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13. 
16. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (incorporating “guidelines supported by the Health 
Resources and Services Administration,” which in turn include all FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods, as prescribed by a health care provider, other than condoms and 
vasectomies, see 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012)); see also Marty Lederman, Compendium of 
posts on Hobby Lobby, Zubik, and related cases, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 8, 2015), http:// 
balkin.blogspot.com/2014/02/compendium-of-posts-on-hobby-lobby-and.html [http:// 
perma.cc/5DQQ-LR6K] (linking to dozens of posts about various aspects of the RFRA cases 
seeking exemptions from the contraception regulation). 
17. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
18. See id. at 2759-60, 2782; see also 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)-(f) (providing the accommodation for 
religious nonprofit organizations).  
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In its current Term, the Supreme Court is considering consolidated cases 
brought by thirty-seven nonprofit organizations.19 Those plaintiffs allege that 
RFRA entitles them to an exemption from even the regulatory accommodation, 
so that neither the organizations themselves, nor the insurance companies  
that administer the employee and student health insurance plans, would 
provide contraception coverage to female beneficiaries. If the Court accepts 
these organizations’ RFRA arguments, many thousands of their employees, 
dependents, and students—unlike nearly all other women in the United 
States—would not be reimbursed for the costs of contraception, which would, 
in turn, result in many more unintended pregnancies.20 
The current tensions within the old free-exercise coalition are not, 
however, solely a function of the RFRA claims involving the contraception 
regulation. As Douglas NeJaime and Reva Siegel elaborate in Conscience Wars,21 
there is widespread fear in some quarters—and presumably hope in others—
that such claims might become a template for similar claims, pursuant to 
federal or state RFRAs or analogous state constitutional provisions, for 
religious exemptions from laws that prohibit discrimination in employment, or 
in the provision of public accommodations, on the basis of sexual orientation.  
Such fears might not be warranted. Because there are not yet many such 
antidiscrimination laws in force, post-Hobby Lobby RFRA claims asserting a 
religious right to discriminate have been rare, and none has yet succeeded.22 
Nor is it likely that courts will adjudicate many such claims in the near future: 
once such antidiscrimination laws do attract enough public support to be 
enacted, very few businesses will be willing to publicly seek the legal right not 
to serve same-sex couples—a sure ticket to financial ruin. And in the unusual 
cases that do proceed to litigation, odds are that few (if any) courts will permit 
 
19. The lead case is Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418. See Marty Lederman, Unpacking the 
Forthcoming RFRA Challenges to the Government’s Accommodation (with Emphasis on Self-
Insured Plans), BALKINIZATION (July 18, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07 
/unpacking-forthcoming-rfra-challenges.html [http://perma.cc/5GZG-ZNJT] (identifying 
the disparate ways in which the regulation would affect the thirty-seven distinct 
petitioners). 
20. See Brief of the Guttmacher Institute and Professor Sara Rosenbaum as Amici Curiae in 
Support of the Government, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418 et al. (Feb. 17, 2016). 
21. Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in 
Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2561-63 (2015). 
22. One such case is currently pending before the Washington Supreme Court: A florist who 
refuses to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding has invoked, inter alia, the religious 
freedom provision of the Washington Constitution’s Declaration of Rights as a defense  
to application of state antidiscrimination laws. See Brief of Appellants at 32-36, State v.  
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 91615-2 (Wash. Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.adfmedia.org/files 
/ArlenesOpeningBrief.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3W4-LR93].  
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retail establishments to exclude same-sex couples, or allow employers to 
discriminate against them.23 
Nevertheless, the prospect of such claims for exemptions from 
antidiscrimination laws is undeniably the genesis of recent efforts by some 
state legislators to enact or strengthen their local RFRAs. Yet those efforts, too, 
have been unavailing, largely because politicians of both parties realize how 
devastating such enactments would be to the economic well-being of 
enterprises in their states.24 Moreover, given the current, inexorable increase in 
public support for same-sex equality norms, it is almost certain that when 
legislatures enact new antidiscrimination statutes, they will not include robust, 
statute-specific religious exemptions within those laws,25 nor enact separate 
laws designed to provide robust religious exemptions to the antidiscrimination 
rules.26 
If this legislative trend continues, then the existing federal and state RFRAs 
will become virtually the whole game—the only possible sources for religious 
exceptions to such new antidiscrimination norms.  
Even so, the prospect of such future RFRA litigation hardly explains why 
many people and organizations who once supported—and who generally 
continue to support—RFRA, RLUIPA, and similar accommodation laws are 
becoming increasingly wary of such cross-cutting religious liberty protections. 
After all, as I explain below, for more than seventy years courts have virtually 
 
23. See generally Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT 
Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 15-24, 67-73 (2015). If any such suits were to meet with 
success, they would most likely be those brought by nonprofit employers seeking to deny 
employment benefits to employees’ same-sex spouses. I am not aware of any such claims 
yet, however. 
24. See Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 631-38 (2015) (describing recent efforts in 
Arizona, Mississippi, Georgia, Indiana, Oklahoma and Arkansas); see also Marty Lederman, 
Hobby Lobby Part XI—Governor Brewer’s Veto in Arizona . . . and Hobby Lobby (Mar.  
12, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/hobby-lobby-part-xi-governor-brewers.html 
[http://perma.cc/6BWM-2XWW]; Alan Blinder and Campbell Robertson, Conservative 
Lawmakers Push New Legal Protections for Opponents of Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.  
3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/gay-rights-religious-freedom-legislation 
-states.html [http://perma.cc/HKG2-Y9FG] (quoting Douglas Laycock as saying that such 
new proposed state RFRAs “have become politically toxic”). 
25. For example, when the federal Non-Discrimination in Employment Act is reintroduced in a 
future Congress, it almost surely will not include the broad religious exemption found in 
earlier versions of the legislation. See Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of 
ENDA after Hobby Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda 
-after-hobby-lobby-decision/ [http://perma.cc/CNR4-BMQV]. 
26. See, e.g., Blinder and Robertson, supra note 24 (reporting that Republican officials and 
business interests are strongly resisting a new round of proposed legal protections for 
opponents of gay rights). 
the contested legacy of religious freedom restoration 
421 
 
always rejected claims for religious exemptions in commercial settings, even 
when they have purported to apply a “compelling interest”/”least restrictive 
means” test of the sort found in RFRA.27 If that decades-old trend were to 
continue, there would be no cause for alarm. 
All of a sudden, however, there is a very real chance, in the forthcoming 
cases involving nonprofits’ RFRA challenges to the contraception regulation 
accommodation, that the Supreme Court might depart sharply from that 
historical norm, and transform RFRA into a much more robust engine of 
religious exemptions to commercial regulations. What brought us to this 
point? Who, if anyone, has betrayed the common ground on which the RFRA 
consensus was so carefully constructed—and how have they done so? Those 
important questions lurk just beneath the surface of Douglas NeJaime and 
Reva Siegel’s timely and provocative Conscience Wars. 
i .  what’s  so new about the new complicity  claims? 
NeJaime and Siegel richly detail two important aspects of the recent 
accommodation claims—characteristics they describe as novel, potentially 
destabilizing, and, perhaps, reasons to be wary of the requested exemptions.  
First, they emphasize a formal feature of the recent claims: the way in 
which the plaintiffs characterize how the challenged laws “substantially 
burden” their exercise of religion. Virtually all of the plaintiffs in the 
contraception and discrimination cases assert that the state would require them 
to facilitate immoral conduct—to be complicit in others’ wrongdoing—in a way 
their religion allegedly prohibits. These sorts of claims, by their very nature, 
label other private parties “as sinners in ways that can stigmatize and 
demean.”28 The employer plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Zubik, for instance, 
assert that the ACA regulation would compel their forbidden complicity in 
employees’ sinful use of contraception (or sinful engagement in nonprocreative 
sex).29 Similarly, the bakery or bed-and-breakfast owner who wishes to turn 
away same-sex couples claims an exemption on the ground that she is 
religiously forbidden from abetting the sin of same-sex marriage or sexual 
activity. 
NeJaime and Siegel are right that this is a distinctive feature of the recent 
controversial RFRA claims. Yet, contrary to their suggestion, such claims are 
not novel, nor are they discordant with Congress’s design in enacting RFRA. 
Several of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise decisions between 1963 and 1990, 
 
27. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
28. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2576.  
29. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 9-10, 34-36, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354); Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, et al. at 51-53, East Texas 
Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, No. 15-35 (Jan. 4, 2016) [hereinafter ETBU Pet. Br.].  
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which RFRA effectively incorporated,30 involved complicity claims, or were 
otherwise predicated upon an asserted religious injunction to be dissociated 
from the sins of others.31  
Regardless of whether such claims are especially new, NeJaime and Siegel 
appear to be concerned that courts adjudicating RFRA claims might not 
recognize, or sufficiently account for, the distinct dignitary harms that are 
inflicted when claimants in effect accuse others of acting immorally. They are 
appropriately careful, however, to clarify that what troubles them is not the 
mere fact of the religious objector’s disapprobation32—something that would 
be apparent even if the court denied the religious exemption33—but, rather, the 
prospect that the state itself would, by conferring the exemption, “express[] 
the message that contraception [or other third-party conduct] is sinful.”34  
Whether the state expresses such a message will depend, of course, “on the 
way the government structures the accommodation.”35 It is difficult to imagine 
a RFRA case, however, in which this concern would determine the outcome. 
Most importantly, in some cases a state agency might be able to craft a 
substitution “work-around” in order to both grant the requested religious 
accommodation and prevent any harm to third parties. The federal agencies’ 
accommodation to the contraception regulation, in which a non-objecting 
 
30. See infra Part III. 
31. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), for example, a corporation’s 
principal owner argued that federal law requiring his barbeque restaurants to serve black 
customers violated his free exercise rights by requiring him to be complicit in sin: based 
upon his reading of the Old Testament, he “believe[d] as a matter of religious faith” that 
such service would be a “contribution” to “racial intermixing,” and would thereby 
“contravene[] the will of God.” Piggie Park, Pet. App. 21a (Second Amended Answer, Sixth 
Defense), id. at 126a (testimony of L. Maurice Bessinger). (In a single terse sentence, the 
Court unanimously held that this free exercise argument was “so patently frivolous” that it 
would “manifestly inequitable” not to reward attorneys’ fees to the parties challenging the 
discrimination. 390 U.S. at 402 n.5.) See also, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983) (university sought to sustain its prohibition on interracial student 
dating, without losing federal tax benefits, because “sponsors of the University genuinely 
believe[d] that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage”); United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 255 & n.3 (1982); Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707, 710-12 (1981).  
32. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2575 n.243 (“Business owners with religious objections to 
same-sex marriage who serve customers in compliance with antidiscrimination laws are still 
free to voice their objections to same-sex marriage.”). 
33. See also Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas NeJaime and 
Reva Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 399, 406 (2016) (noting that religious exercise, including 
worship and proselytization, frequently subjects nonbelievers to moral stigma).  
34. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2583 n.275. 
35. Id.; see also id. at 2586 (suggesting that the state should find “ways to accommodate religious 
persons without giving legal sanction to their view that other law-abiding citizens are 
sinning”(emphasis added)). 
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insurance company does what the objecting religious employer wishes to 
avoid, is an accommodation of this sort. So, too, is a recent North Carolina law 
that gives an individual magistrate the right to categorically recuse from 
performing marriages for a six-month period “based upon any sincerely held 
religious objection,” but that also requires the chief district court judge to 
“ensure that all individuals issued a marriage license seeking to be married 
before a magistrate may marry,” and requires the Administrative Office of the 
Courts to ensure that a substitute magistrate is available to perform marriages 
in a hypothetical jurisdiction where all the magistrates have recused.36  
Where the state fashions such an accommodation, its manifest judgment 
about the underlying legal norm (e.g., that women should have ready access to 
affordable contraception, or that same-sex couples should not be subject to 
discrimination) puts the state itself at odds with the religious objectors on the 
question of whether the third party’s conduct is moral or sinful. In such cases, 
the state has not embraced or ratified the objectors’ view about sinful conduct; 
it has, instead, navigated a way to respect the conscience of the objector while 
also ensuring that the law continues to work as designed, without 
compromising the rights of third parties. These are, in effect, “win/win” 
solutions of the sort the Court in Hobby Lobby hoped it had fashioned under 
RFRA.37 
In other situations, however, where such a work-around is not available, 
recognizing a complicity-based RFRA claim would deny third parties a public 
benefit, or equal access to “public establishments.”38 In those cases, the 
material harms themselves, together with the “stigmatizing injury” that 
“‘surely accompanies’” an exclusion in the public accommodation setting,39 will 
be more than sufficient to justify denying the RFRA exemption.40 Accordingly, 
any additional harm associated with the implication of sinful conduct will 
virtually never affect how courts decide such cases. A court that has already 
denied the RFRA exemption based upon material harm to third parties, and/or 
the dignitary harm caused by the exclusion itself, will not need to fall back on 
the distinct harm associated with the taint of “immoral” conduct. And if, by 
contrast, a judge is determined (improperly) to grant a RFRA exemption 
despite the material or dignitary harm to third parties, it is hard to imagine  
 
36. N.C. GEN. STATUTES § 51-5.5(a), (c). 
37. See 134 S. Ct. at 2760 (“The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women 
employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would 
be precisely zero. Under that accommodation, these women would still be entitled to all 
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing.”). 
38. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). 
39. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
379 U.S. at 250). 
40. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. 
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that the implied accusation of sin would affect that judge’s disposition. In  
all events, the objectors’ allegation of immoral conduct is unlikely to be 
determinative of the RFRA claim. 
The more significant component of NeJaime and Siegel’s critique is their 
demonstration that the new complicity claims receive much different, and 
more sophisticated, support than religious exemption claims have ever before 
enjoyed. Historically, claims for exemption from commercial regulations were 
idiosyncratic, brought intermittently by plaintiffs who rarely engendered 
sustained assistance or political support. By contrast, dozens of plaintiffs, 
including major corporations, reputable and well-established educational 
institutions (including the University of Notre Dame and Catholic University), 
and even some Roman Catholic archdioceses, have raised RFRA claims in the 
contraception cases.  
As NeJaime and Siegel describe the phenomenon, mobilized groups, 
together with public officials and important figures in the broader movement 
opposing same-sex marriage and contraceptive rights, have collectively 
encouraged and organized the new complicity claims, and have retained a 
sophisticated cadre of attorneys to litigate them, all in the service of a  
broader political and moral agenda. On this view, a principal objective of the 
complicity claims is not to promote pluralism, or to “turn down the 
temperature” by carving out discrete enclaves where religious objectors can 
quietly preserve remnants of the old moral order,41 but instead to foment 
continued opposition to the new moral norms, so as to “enable the conflict to 
persist in a new, revitalized form,” and possibly even to lay the groundwork for 
a restoration of the recently vanquished traditional norms as part of the formal 
state legal order.42 
NeJaime and Siegel’s descriptive account is compelling. It is not entirely 
clear, however, what (if anything) follows from it in terms of how 
administrators and judges ought to treat the exemption claims themselves.  
 
41. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benificente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432 
(2006) (granting RFRA exemption to the Controlled Substances Act where the government 
had failed to demonstrate that the “circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca” by a 130-
member Christian Spiritist sect would result in the harms ordinarily associated with the use 
of hallucinogens). 
42. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2563. As Sam Bagenstos similarly observes, such claims 
for exemption might be part of a strategic retreat to more politically congenial ground from 
which to resist or partially roll back the new norms. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1219, 
1233, 1239-40 (2014); see also William P. Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 122 (“RFRA claims can be used for immediate political 
effect such as weakening the political viability of a challenged provision. A judicial 
determination that a law offends religious principle sends a negative message about that 
law, particularly when the determination is that the law transgresses the beliefs of a 
mainstream religion.”). 
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Another commenter in this symposium, Douglas Laycock, reads NeJaime 
and Siegel to be arguing that the state has an independent “compelling 
governmental interest” in denying exemptions in order to preserve the newly 
emergent moral code against efforts to sustain the political conflict.43 I am not 
sure NeJaime and Siegel mean to advance such a bold idea—certainly, they do 
not do so directly.44  
In any event, such a suggestion would fall on deaf ears: no state would ever 
argue, in an actual case, that it has a legitimate, let alone a compelling, interest 
in suppressing a political debate that might threaten to alter the existing legal 
regime. After all, presumably there was nothing problematic, from the state’s 
point of view, when the former political minority spent decades fighting  
to upend the then-majoritarian views limiting access to contraception and 
marriage equality. So why should the state’s posture toward the revanchist 
strategy by the old guard be any different? Indeed, when a period of intense 
moral contestation culminates in adoption of the newly emergent majority 
norms as part of the state's fundamental legal code, the suppression of 
alternative constitutional narratives can be a deeply unfortunate collateral cost 
of an evolution that is otherwise grounds for celebration.45 It would therefore 
be troublesome, at the very least, for the state to assert that such suppression of 
the once-dominant perspective—or the cessation of a principled public debate 
that only recently shifted in valence—is itself a compelling government interest 
that might independently justify denial of what would otherwise be a valid 
RFRA claim. I do not read NeJaime and Siegel to be suggesting otherwise. 
Nonetheless, NeJaime and Siegel’s descriptive account is important for 
another reason: The historical and institutional context they describe helps to 
explain a feature of the new RFRA claims that NeJaime and Siegel do not 
emphasize, but that is, I think, the principal source of the emerging tensions in 
the old RFRA coalition. Precisely because so much is at stake in the new 
complicity claims, beyond simply the ability of a handful of religious believers 
to carve out a private space in which they can freely practice their religion, the 
proponents of the new complicity claims have engaged in a concerted and 
sophisticated effort to have the courts untether the substance of RFRA analysis 
 
43. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to 
NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 371 (2016). 
44. Laycock fixes on one sentence in their article that could be read to suggest such a view: “If 
granting a religious accommodation would harm those protected by the antidiscrimination 
law or undermine societal values and goals the statute promotes, then unencumbered 
enforcement of the statute is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s 
compelling ends.” Id. (quoting NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 21, at 2581 (emphasis added by 
Laycock)). Laycock reads this sentence to suggest that the state should have a compelling 
interest in denying exemptions even if no one would “actually be harmed,” so long as the 
“religious exemptions might help sustain a political argument over government policy.” Id. 
45. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
the yale law journal forum  March 16, 2016 
426 
 
from its grounding in the Supreme Court’s historical jurisprudence of religious 
exemptions. As I explain in the remainder of this essay, this novel initiative, if 
successful, would have a dramatic and unprecedented impact on the law of 
religious accommodations. 
i i .  the doctrinal innovations of the new rfra complicity  
claims 
The proponents of the new exemptions have consistently made two 
noteworthy arguments that could, in combination, induce the Supreme Court 
to fundamentally transform the jurisprudence of religious exemptions.  
A. Deference to Complicity-Based Theories of Substantial Burden 
First, in order to establish that the contraceptive coverage rule substantially 
burdens their religious exercise, the RFRA claimants have exploited the 
Supreme Court’s traditional, and understandable, reluctance to evaluate 
believers’ assertions of what constitutes religiously prohibited complicity in 
another’s wrongful conduct. The Court credited the plaintiffs’ complicity 
arguments in Hobby Lobby, for instance. Invoking pre-RFRA Free Exercise 
doctrine, the majority explained that because “‘courts must not presume to 
determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim,’”46 the judiciary’s “‘narrow 
function . . . in this context’” is solely “‘to determine’ whether the line the 
plaintiff has drawn reflects ‘an honest conviction.’”47 
It is not as obvious as the Court made it sound that such complicity 
assessments—which generally do not depend upon biblical injunction or 
received truth, nor require “scriptural interpretation”48—are invariably the 
sorts of religious claims that civil authorities are incapable of assessing. But 
that is a topic for another day. For present purposes, the significant point is 
that the Justices appear to be deeply reluctant to interrogate such claims. The 
RFRA claimants’ very framing of their alleged religious obligations therefore 
might be sufficient to clear the RFRA hurdle of showing a “substantial burden” 
on their exercise of religion.49 
 
46. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (quoting Employment 
Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990)). 
47. Id. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 
(1981)). 
48. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. 
49. But see Brief for the Respondents at 41-53, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, et al. (Feb. 10, 
2016) (arguing that petitioners have not established a substantial burden as a matter of law, 
even assuming the substance of their complicity claims); Brief of Baptist Joint Committee 
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This in turn shifts virtually all of the doctrinal action to the “back end” of 
RFRA—to the government’s burden of showing that denial of the religious 
exemption is the “least restrictive means” of furthering compelling state 
interests.50 It is with respect to that question that the recent claimants have 
urged the Supreme Court to fundamentally alter how it assesses RFRA claims, 
in a manner that would upend the compromise of 1993 and deviate from the 
consistent judicial practice of the past half-century.  
B. Treating RFRA’s “Compelling Interest” / “Least Restrictive Means” Test as 
“Exceptionally Demanding” 
In Hobby Lobby, the religious claimants argued that RFRA’s “compelling 
interest” / “least restrictive means” test “is ‘the most demanding test known to 
constitutional law.’”51 Justice Alito, author of the majority opinion, appeared to 
agree: the government’s burden, he wrote, is “exceptionally demanding.”52 
Most alarmingly, Justice Alito went so far as to suggest that if Congress might 
conceivably appropriate new funds to compensate for the harms that a 
religious exemption would visit upon third parties, the possibility of such a 
new appropriations statute—no matter how unlikely—could be “a viable 
alternative,” and thus a less restrictive means of advancing the government’s 
interests, thereby requiring conferral of the RFRA exemptions.53 
The Court did not hold either of these things.54 But the petitioners in the 
current nonprofit cases are now urging the Court to do so55—a prospect that 
could have a dramatic impact on the ability of the government to deny RFRA 
 
for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7-26, Zubik v. 
Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, et al. (Feb. 17, 2016) (same). 
50. See Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Religious Liberty Sarah Barringer Gordon, R. Kent 
Greenawalt, Martin S. Lederman, Ira C. Lupu, and Robert W. Tuttle in Support of 
Respondents at 23-24, Zubik v. Burwell, Nos. 14-1418, et al. (Feb. 17, 2016) [hereinafter 
Zubik Religious Liberty Scholars Br.]; see also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 
700 (1989) (reasoning that the more capacious the theory of religious burden, the more 
“powerful” is the Government’s interest in avoiding religious exemptions).  
51. Brief of Respondents at 44, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 
13-354) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997)). 
52. 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532). 
53. Id. at 2780. 
54. In a footnote, Justice Alito wrote that “[f]or present purposes, it is unnecessary to adjudicate 
th[e] dispute” about whether RFRA established a new, much more searching, form of a 
“least restrictive means” test. Id. at 2678 n.18. And although it granted the requested RFRA 
exemptions, the Court ultimately did not “rely on the option of a new, government-
funded program in order to conclude that the HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive-
means test.” Id. at 2781-82; see also id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stressing that the 
Court had not decided that question). 
55. See, e.g., ETBU Pet. Br., supra note 29, at 72-74.  
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exemptions that would harm third parties or otherwise frustrate compelling 
government interests. It is therefore important to explain why Justice Alito’s 
assumptions about what Congress did when it enacted RFRA are 
fundamentally mistaken. 
i i i .  what did rfra “restore”?  
RFRA was a legislative response to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.56 In Smith, the Court “virtually eliminated the 
[constitutional] requirement that the government justify burdens on religious 
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion”57—something the Court had 
insisted upon in a series of Free Exercise Clause cases over the previous thirty 
years. According to Congress, in those earlier Free Exercise cases the Court had 
applied “a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty 
and competing prior governmental interests.”58 Accordingly, it enacted RFRA 
to “restore,” as a statutory mandate, that “compelling interest test.”59 
 In Hobby Lobby, however, Justice Alito tentatively endorsed an assumption 
the Court had made in a much earlier case—namely, that “RFRA’s ‘least 
restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence 
RFRA purported to codify.’”60 ”On this understanding of our pre-
Smith cases,” wrote Justice Alito, “RFRA did more than merely restore the 
balancing test used in the Sherbert line of [Free Exercise] cases; it provided 
even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those 
decisions.”61  
Which is it? Did RFRA restore a test that the Court had applied before 
Smith, or did Congress impose a new obligation on the government that 
provides much more robust protection for religious exemptions than the Court 
did before 1990? In order to answer that question, it is necessary to examine 
how the RFRA consensus in Congress almost broke apart in the early 1990s, 
and how it was salvaged. 
Virtually all members of Congress agreed that Congress should enact a law 
that would effectively “correct” what they saw as the Court’s mistake in Smith, 
by restoring the substance of the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence. There was 
one big problem, however. The actual language the sponsors settled upon to 
describe the government’s burden—to show that denial of a religious 
 
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
58. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
59. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
60. 134 S. Ct. at 2761 n.3 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509). 
61. Id. (emphasis added). 
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exemption “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling 
governmental interest”62—had the potential, if read literally, to be much more 
restrictive than anything the Court had insisted upon in its pre-Smith 
jurisprudence, including, especially, a series of cases in the 1980s in which the 
Court had repeatedly rejected religious exemptions to federal laws. The 
prospect that the courts might construe RFRA to require exemptions that 
would have been denied before Smith threatened to tear apart the delicate 
congressional consensus. 
Just as reproductive rights are at the heart of the current RFRA disputes, 
so, too, were they the sticking point during the negotiation of RFRA in the 
early 1990s. The concern at that earlier time, however, was not that religious 
objectors might use RFRA to interfere with reproductive rights, but precisely 
the opposite: many Catholic legislators and organizations, including most 
importantly the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, opposed RFRA because 
they feared that, as originally drafted, it might compel exemptions to abortion 
restrictions for women who claimed they were religiously motivated to choose 
abortion.63 Although the idea might appear far-fetched in retrospect, the 
prospect that RFRA would become the engine of abortion rights dominated 
the legislative debates, and prevented enactment of the bill for almost two 
years.64 
Indeed, the abortion-related concerns were so pronounced that leading 
House Republican sponsors Paul Henry and Henry Hyde withdrew their 
support for RFRA.65 As Representative Hyde would later recount, the test 
prescribed in the bill “was of particular concern to me in the area of abortion 
rights.”66 Under settled pre-Smith law, Hyde explained, there was no prospect 
of successful RFRA claims for exemptions to abortion restrictions; yet “[a] 
major issue of contention in the 102d Congress was whether the bill was a true 
restoration of the law as it existed prior to Smith or whether it sought to 
impose a more stringent statutory standard.”67 
 
62. Id. § 2000bb-1(1)-(2).  
63. See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 100, 106-110 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearing] http:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/02/13/hear-j-102-82-1992.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/8G2H-8KEW] (testimony and statement of Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel, 
U.S. Catholic Conference); id. at 203-40 (testimony and statement of James Bopp, Jr., 
General Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.). 
64. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (“There has been much debate about this act’s relevance 
to the issue of abortion.”); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 231-34, 236-38 (1994) (recounting the legislative 
deliberations about abortion).  
65. Id. at 237. 
66. 139 CONG. REC. 9682 (1993). 
67. Id. 
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In order to bridge the abortion divide, RFRA proponents changed the bill, 
prior to its reintroduction in the 103d Congress, to “make clear that the 
statutory standard of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is the same free 
exercise standard that was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court prior to 
Smith.”68 As so amended, it became clear that “the Religious Freedom Act is 
not seeking to impose a new and strengthened compelling State interest 
standard, but is seeking to replicate, by statute, the same free exercise test that 
was applied prior to Smith.”69 In particular, as Representative Hyde explained, 
“[t]he bill now clearly imposes a statutory standard that is to be interpreted as 
incorporating all Federal court cases prior to Smith.”70 
According to Douglas Laycock and Oliver Thomas—both of whom were 
deeply involved in the efforts of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion 
to secure passage of the bill—what finally sealed the deal, and guaranteed 
Representative Hyde’s endorsement, was language the sponsors added to the 
committee reports.71 That crucial addition expressly made it “absolutely clear” 
that RFRA “does not expand, contract or alter the ability of a claimant to 
obtain relief in a manner consistent with free exercise jurisprudence, including 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, under the compelling governmental interest test 
prior to Smith.”72 
This report language, “agreed to by all of the bill’s lead sponsors,”73 finally 
broke the logjam. Representative Hyde, the Catholic Bishops, and other 
abortion opponents were mollified precisely because there was universal 
recognition that the pre-1990 “free exercise jurisprudence” that RFRA would 
incorporate had rarely afforded claimants the “ability . . . to obtain relief”74  
in any contexts that members of the legislative consensus would strongly 
oppose. And that was so because the results of the Court’s pre-Smith Free 
 
68. Id. Most importantly, the formal legislative findings were rewritten to clarify that “the 
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking 
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (emphasis added). See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A 
Lawyer’s Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 196-97 & n.97 
(1995). In addition, an earlier iteration of RFRA would have required the government to 
show that denial of an exemption was “essential to” a compelling government interest, see 
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong. § 3(b) (1991), but RFRA as enacted requires the government to show 
instead that such a denial would be “in furtherance” of a compelling interest, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-1(b). 
69. 139 CONG. REC. 9682 (1993) (remarks of Rep. Hyde). 
70. Id. 
71. Laycock & Thomas, supra note 64, at 237-38. 
72. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 8 (1993); accord S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 12 (1993) (materially 
indistinguishable language). 
73. Laycock & Thomas, supra note 64, at 237. 
74. H.R. REP. 103-88, at 8. 
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Exercise cases hardly reflected a searching judicial review of state justifications 
for denying religious exemptions: the government almost always prevailed, 
notwithstanding the Court’s use of the language of so-called “strict scrutiny.”75 
The eleventh-hour report language, which confirmed “the purpose of 
[RFRA] . . . to ‘turn the clock back’ to the day before Smith was decided,”76 
had the additional virtue of accurately reflecting the original impetus for the 
legislative initiative that led to RFRA. “[T]he purpose of this act,” according to 
the Senate Report, was “only to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith”77—not to challenge the manner in which the Court had applied the 
“compelling interest”/”least restrictive means” test in the cases preceding 
Smith. Those decisions, unlike Smith, did not prompt any congressional 
“restoration” movement. And so, for example, the lead House sponsor of the 
bill explained that RFRA would “simply restore the legal standard for 
protecting religious freedom that worked so well for more than a generation.”78  
If all of this is true, why did Justice Alito, in Hobby Lobby, describe RFRA’s 
test as “exceptionally demanding,”79 and why did he assume that “RFRA did 
more than merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of [Free 
Exercise] cases” by “provid[ing] even broader protection for religious liberty 
than was available under those decisions”?80  
Justice Alito’s mistakes had their genesis in earlier dicta of the Court in City 
of Boerne v. Flores,81 a RFRA case in which it appears the Justices were misled 
by the parties’ briefing. The petitioner, City of Boerne, represented to the 
Court that “the least restrictive means test has not been a staple of [the Court’s 
pre-Smith] free exercise doctrine,”82 and “marks a sea change from prior free 
exercise law.”83 Perhaps for tactical reasons, neither the respondent (the 
Archbishop of San Antonio) nor the United States took issue with this 
 
75. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990) (“At the Supreme Court level, the free 
exercise compelling interest test was a Potemkin doctrine.”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting 
Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994) (describing the pre-Smith doctrine as 
“strict in theory but feeble in fact”); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 (1992) (describing it as “strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact”). 
76. H.R. REP. 103-88, at 14-15 (statement of Reps. Hyde, Sensenbrenner, McCollum, Coble, 
Canady, Inglis, and Goodlatte). 
77. S. REP. 103-111, at 12 (emphasis added). 
78. 137 CONG. REC. 17036 (1991) (remarks of Rep. Solarz). 
79. 134 S. Ct. at 2780. 
80. Id. at 2761 n.3. 
81. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
82. Brief for Petitioner at 17, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074). 
83. Id. at 22; see also id. (“[T]he most oppressive aspect of RFRA for governments—the least 
restrictive means test—is a virtual novelty in the free exercise arena.”). 
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mischaracterization; indeed, they did not even discuss the least restrictive 
means test in their briefs or at oral argument. Not surprisingly, then, the City of 
Boerne Court came close to adopting the city’s (mis)reading: Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion assumed that the least restrictive means requirement “was not 
used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify”84; and it 
described that test as “stringent”—”the most demanding test known to 
constitutional law.”85 Seventeen years later, Justice Alito, citing City of Boerne, 
reiterated these mistaken assumptions in the Court’s opinion in Hobby Lobby. 
In fact, a “least restrictive means test” had been a staple of the Court’s pre-
Smith Free Exercise doctrine. In Thomas v. Review Board, for instance, Chief 
Justice Burger wrote that “[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious liberty 
by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling 
state interest.”86 The Court used the same or equivalent expressions of the 
constitutional test in cases both before and after Thomas.87 Indeed, by time of 
Smith, that formulation had become so well-established that Justice O’Connor 
described the Court as having “consistently” applied a least restrictive means 
test,88 and Justice Blackmun referred to it as “a consistent and exacting 
standard” that the Court had “over the years painstakingly . . . developed.”89 
This doctrinal feature was not a secret to Congress as it deliberated upon 
RFRA. The chief House sponsor, a leading academic expert on the law of 
religious liberty, and the Congressional Research Service all informed the 
legislators that the “less restrictive means” component of RFRA derived from 
 
84. 521 U.S. at 535. 
85. 521 U.S. at 533, 534. The Court left open the possibility, however, that “RFRA would be 
interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test.” Id. at 534. 
86. 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (emphasis added). 
87. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f the State 
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of 
which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden 
on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose 
such a burden.”(emphasis added)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (“[I]t would 
plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of 
regulation would combat [the problem] without infringing First Amendment rights.”); 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“The state may justify a limitation on 
religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental 
interest.”(emphasis added)); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) 
(“The interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with [the government’s] 
compelling governmental interest . . . , and no ‘less restrictive means’ . . . are available to 
achieve the governmental interest”(quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718)). 
88. 494 U.S. at 899 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
89. Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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the Court’s pre-Smith doctrine.90 Thus, as the House Report explained, it was 
“the Committee’s expectation that the courts will look to free exercise of 
religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or 
not . . . the least restrictive means have been employed in furthering a 
compelling governmental interest.”91  
iv .   how  to apply rfra’s  “least  restrictive  means” test 
But how can that be? If the Court rarely ruled in favor of religious 
exemptions before Smith, how could it possibly have been applying a “least 
restrictive means” test? 
The key to understanding this apparent conundrum is to recognize that not 
all “compelling interest”/“least restrictive means” tests are created alike.92 In 
particular, there is an important difference between the rigorous scrutiny the 
Court usually applies when evaluating a statute that is specifically aimed at 
restricting constitutionally protected conduct (or status), and the heightened, 
but less severe, scrutiny the Court sometimes uses to assess whether the state 
can justify incidental burdens on protected conduct.  
The first, more familiar variant of “strict” scrutiny establishes a 
presumption that the statute itself is facially invalid, precisely because the 
legislature has targeted constitutionally protected activity or status. The Court 
deploys this approach, for example, when a statute regulates expression on the 
basis of its content,93 discriminates on the basis of race,94 or where the “object 
 
90. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before the 
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d 
Cong. 121 (1992) (written statement of Rep. Solarz); id. at 342 (written statement of 
Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, University of Texas); 1992 Senate Hearing, supra note 
80, at 78–79 (written statement of Prof. Laycock); DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., LTR92-639, THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND THE RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 6 (1992).  
91. H.R. Rep. 103-88, at 6-7. There is one respect in which RFRA was designed to alter the pre-
Smith doctrinal status quo: Congress intended that the courts would apply “compelling 
interest/”least restrictive means” test in contexts where the Supreme Court had previously 
applied a more deferential standard—namely, in the so-called state “enclaves” of prisons and 
the military. See S. REP. 103-111, at 9-12 (explaining the intent to apply a more stringent 
standard than what the Court had applied in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987) (prisons), and in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military)); H.R. REP. 
103-88, at 7-8 (same). 
92. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007); 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).  
93. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-66 (2004); United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000). 
94. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). 
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of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious 
motivation.”95 Such a law will survive the Court’s “strict scrutiny” “only in rare 
cases.”96 In such contexts, the “narrow tailoring” or “least restrictive means” 
component of the doctrinal test asks, in effect, whether the state could have 
furthered its compelling interests without targeting, such as by using race-
neutral, content-neutral, or religion-neutral criteria. If the answer is “yes,” then 
the legislature typically must start from scratch and consider such neutral 
alternative means of advancing its interests.  
By contrast, when a statute does not single out a protected activity or status, 
it is presumptively (and facially) constitutional. Even so, in some such cases the 
Court has applied a form of heightened scrutiny, including a “narrow 
tailoring” or “less restrictive means” requirement, to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the law’s incidental impact on protected activity in particular 
applications.97 For example, that is how the Court has sometimes analyzed 
antidiscrimination laws that incidentally limit the right of “expressive 
association,”98 and laws regulating conduct (such as public nudity or burning 
draft cards) that incidentally burden expressive activity.99 
Most importantly for present purposes, it is also how the Court analyzed 
incidental burdens on religious exercise in the decades before Smith. In these 
cases, the terms of the Court’s heightened scrutiny test were similar to the 
language the Court uses when assessing facial challenges to targeting 
legislation, but the Court’s manner of applying the test was very different—and 
much more permissive.100 And it was this more forgiving version of heightened 
scrutiny that Congress incorporated into RFRA.  
As cases both before and after Smith demonstrate, RFRA’s “compelling 
interest”/“least restrictive means” test is by no means toothless. Most 
importantly, the government must show that the state’s conferral of a religious 
exemption in the discrete setting of the particular claimants (and any others 
similarly situated) would actually undermine the interests underlying the 
generally applicable law. The government may not simply rely upon “broadly 
formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government 
 
95. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
96. Id. at 546. 
97. See Fallon, supra note 92, at 1318-20. 
98. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1984). 
99. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (plurality opinion); United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1968). 
100. See infra notes 105-108, 117-120 and accompanying text. 
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mandates”; instead, it must demonstrate the “harm of granting specific 
exemptions to particular religious claimants.”101 
Moreover, even when a state can show that religious exemptions might 
have an impact on its compelling interests, if many other jurisdictions have 
avoided those harms by using other means even while conferring such 
exemptions, the challenged state “must, at a minimum, offer persuasive 
reasons why it believes that it must take a different course.”102 And if the 
government administrators already have other, obvious alternative means of 
dealing with the asserted problems, they must grant the religious exemption 
and use those alternative means unless they can show that doing so would 
threaten additional harms or material costs.103  
Nevertheless, in the context of assessing incidental burdens on religious 
exercise, the Court has never applied the “compelling interest”/”least restrictive 
means” test with remotely the same degree of scrutiny or skepticism as when 
the Court confronts a law that targets constitutionally protected rights. Rather, 
as the Court stated in Yoder, the de facto inquiry under the pre-Smith  
Free Exercise cases—now incorporated into RFRA—is a more context-
sensitive, pragmatic assessment of whether the neutral regulation “in its 
application . . . unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”104 
Two aspects of this version of the “least restrictive means” test are 
especially germane to the current RFRA disputes. First, both before and  
after Smith, the Court has denied religious exemptions where they would 
impose harms on third parties. Second, the Court has never required the 
government to adopt a proposed alternative means of furthering its compelling 
interests if it would require enactment of a new statute—especially an 
additional appropriation—in order to ameliorate the impact of religious 
exemptions on compelling government interests.  
 
101. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431; see also Zubik Religious Liberty Scholars Br., supra note 50, at 19-
20, 21 n.13 (explaining how the failure to meet this burden required the conferral of religious 
exemptions in O Centro and Yoder). 
102. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 866; see also, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 & n.7. 
103. See, e.g., Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864 (Arkansas Department of Correction had “failed to prove that 
it could not adopt the less restrictive alternative of having the prisoner run a comb through 
his beard” to find hidden weapons). 
104. 406 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) 
(describing the “inquiry” as whether the religious accommodation, for the claimant and 
similarly situated objectors, “will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental 
interest”). State and lower federal courts have long interpreted and implemented the pre-
Smith Free Exercise test, as well as RFRA, RLUIPA, and their state-law counterparts, in 
accord with this pragmatic understanding of the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence. 
See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & GEN. 35, 50-53, 54-66 (2015). 
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These limitations explain why, for many decades before Smith, the Court 
never recognized religious exemptions to generally applicable laws regulating 
the commercial sphere, even where the Court purported to apply a demanding 
“substantial burden”/“compelling interest” test. The Court rejected such claims 
at least ten times between 1944 and 1990, in cases involving many different 
sorts of commercial regulation, including child protection laws105; wage and 
hour legislation106; Sunday closing laws107; and tax obligations.108  
A. Third-Party Burdens 
In commercial settings, recognizing a religious exemption would typically 
require third parties (customers, employees, and/or competitors) to bear 
burdens in the service of another’s religion, which would violate one of the 
central tenets of the First Amendment, namely, that nonbelievers should not be 
compelled to subsidize, or suffer in the service of, the religious commitments of 
others: “It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees 
that government may not coerce anyone to support . . . religion or its 
exercise.”109 Indeed, where religious exemptions impose significant costs upon 
 
105. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
106. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
107. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of 
Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
108. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez 
v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Covenant Community Church v. Lowe, 475 U.S. 
1078 (1986) (dismissing appeal for want of substantial federal question); United States v. 
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).  
The votes in these cases were rarely even close. With the exception of the “Sunday 
closing” cases (which were colored by a dubious legislative preference for the traditional 
Christian day of rest), it was rare for even a single Justice to support a religious exemption. 
Justice Murphy would have granted the exemption in Prince, but only because he concluded 
that the case did not involve commercial activity. 321 U.S. at 171 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
109. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 
U.S. 703, 710 (1984) (describing as a “fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses” that 
“‘[t]he First Amendment gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own 
interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities’” (quoting 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J.))). Douglas 
Laycock is of course correct that “[m]ost exercises of constitutional rights inflict costs on 
others.” Laycock, supra note 43, at 379. There is, for instance, no independent constitutional 
imperative that private individuals not bear the costs of others’ speech, or that application of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to protect a criminal defendant must not impose harms 
on members of the public. Indeed, such third-party harms are ubiquitous when those other 
constitutional rights are vindicated. But that is decidedly not true with respect to religious 
exercise, where it has long been a constitutional tenet that an individual who does not share 
another’s belief in God should not have to pay a cost so that the believer can follow what she 
believes to be God’s dictates. Cf. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST 
RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS ¶ 3 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 
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third parties, they can raise serious Establishment Clause concerns.110 For these 
reasons, the state has a compelling interest in denying exemptions that pose a 
risk of third-party harms.  
The Court’s rejection of claims for religious exemptions to 
antidiscrimination laws nicely illustrates that when a religious accommodation 
would harm the civil rights of third parties—even a relatively small group of 
third parties—the government is not required to grant the exemption. In Bob 
Jones University v. United States, for example, the Court held that the Internal 
Revenue Service’s refusal to grant tax-exempt status to private schools that 
practiced racial discrimination was necessary to further the government’s 
compelling interest in eradicating race discrimination, even though the effect of 
the requested exemption would only have been felt by the relatively small 
number of African American students who would choose to attend the small 
handful of the nation’s schools of higher education that had retained 
discriminatory practices.111 
 
1, 64, 65-66 (1947) (remonstrating that the government in a free society may not “force a 
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment” of religion). 
110. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709-10 (holding that a religious accommodation 
statute was unconstitutional in part because it “would cause the employer substantial 
economic burdens or . . . require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees 
required to work in place of the Sabbath observers”); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 
U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (plurality opinion) (characterizing religious exemptions that “burden[] 
non-beneficiaries markedly” as “unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious 
organizations”). But cf. Corporation for Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) 
(holding that the exemption to Title VII’s prohibition against employment discrimination 
on the basis of religion, permitting religious organizations to prefer employment of 
coreligionists, was constitutional as applied to a church’s discharge of a gymnasium building 
engineer). 
111. 461 U.S. at 603-04; see also Zubik Religious Liberty Scholars Br., supra note 50, at 25-27 
(discussing Bob Jones); id. at 17-18 (discussing the distinction between Braunfeld and Sherbert 
in terms of the risk of third-party harms in the earlier case). Petitioners in the pending Zubik 
case therefore are mistaken when they argue that the government must demonstrate how 
many plan beneficiaries would take advantage of subsidized contraception if the 
organizations’ RFRA exemptions were denied. See Reply Brief for Petitioners in Nos. 14-
1418 et al. at 32-33, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (Mar. 11, 2016). The United States has a 
compelling interest in ensuring that the women covered by the plans in question are not 
denied access to cost-free coverage, whether they number in the tens or hundreds of 
thousands (as the government estimates), or “merely” hundreds. What is more, to the 
extent petitioners were correct that some of the women in question would not use 
contraception, or would not seek reimbursement for it, in those cases the petitioners’ 
“complicity in sin” theory of substantial burden would be inapposite.   
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B. The Prospect of Further Legislation as a “Less Restrictive Means” 
In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito suggested that applying a law to religious 
objectors cannot be the “least restrictive” means of advancing compelling 
government interest if the legislature might in theory appropriate additional 
funds to further those interests.112 Likewise, the petitioners in the current Zubik 
litigation, invoking cases challenging the facial validity of content-
discriminatory speech restrictions, argue that the Court “routinely identifies 
options that would require congressional action as feasible less restrictive 
means.”113 They thus insist that RFRA entitles them to an exemption from the 
agencies’ accommodation because Congress could, for example, enact a new 
law allowing their employees to purchase a subsidized, second insurance plan 
on an insurance exchange.114  
It is true that RFRA and RLUIPA “may in some circumstances require the 
Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious 
beliefs.”115 For example, if the executive branch already has access to 
appropriated funds that it could lawfully use to ameliorate third-party harms, 
it might have to use those funds to do so, all else being equal.116 It is another 
thing entirely, however, to suggest that the theoretical prospect of a new 
appropriations statute is a “less restrictive means” for purposes of the RFRA 
inquiry.  
Inquiring about the prospect of alternative legislative action makes perfect 
sense when the Court applies its more familiar form of “strict scrutiny,” such as 
in assessing the constitutionality of a content-based federal speech restriction. 
In such cases, the operative question is whether Congress could have addressed 
its interests by enacting a different, content-neutral law. If the Court concludes 
that such a neutral law would have sufficed as a “less restrictive” means of 
dealing with the problem, the Court typically declares that the challenged law 
is facially invalid—in which case the legislature, if it wishes to address the 
problem, must go back to the drawing board.  
 
112. 134 S. Ct. at 2780-81. 
113. See ETBU Pet. Br., supra note 29, at 74 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 669 (2004); 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000)); see also Brief for Petitioners 
in Nos. 14-1418, et al. at 81, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (Jan. 4, 2016). 
114. ETBU Pet. Br., supra note 29, at 73-74. 
115. 134 S. Ct. at 2781. RLUIPA expressly provides that “this chapter may require a government 
to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(c). 
116. Indeed, as part of the contraception accommodation itself, the agencies use their existing 
authority to reduce user fees in order to reimburse third-party administrators of self-insured 
employee health plans for the costs of contraception coverage. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
2713A(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 156.50(d); see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763 n.8. 
the contested legacy of religious freedom restoration 
439 
 
 By contrast, when it comes to a facially valid law of general applicability, 
such as the contraceptive regulation, religious objectors of many kinds might, 
over the years, seek exemptions. At those later times (and there could be many 
of them), Congress and/or the President might be hostile or indifferent to the 
compelling interests underlying the original law—interests that the courts 
applying RFRA are required to account for. But even if the later-in-time 
executive and legislature do care about those state interests, they will invariably 
have more pressing legislative agendas, and will lack the incentives and/or 
political capital to pass legislation to pay for the costs of all and sundry 
requested RFRA exemptions down through the years. It therefore would make 
little sense to view the mere fact that future legislatures have the authority to 
enact such piecemeal “RFRA fixes” as establishing a “less restrictive” 
alternative that requires religious exemptions that will, in fact, undermine the 
state’s compelling interests.  
This is hardly a “radically revisionist account of RFRA.”117 It is, instead, 
consistent with the outcomes of the Court’s pre-Smith Free Exercise cases and 
with its decisions under RFRA and RLUIPA. In every case in which the Court 
has recognized a religious exemption (such as Sherbert, Yoder, O Centro, and 
Holt), no further legislation was necessary to empower the state executive to 
implement that exemption. By contrast, the Court has never granted an 
exemption on the grounds that theoretical supplemental legislation might 
ameliorate the harm to state interests.  
United States v. Lee is illustrative. Lee, an employer and member of the Old 
Order Amish, believed it was sinful for his employees, all of whom were also 
his co-religionists, to accept government aid. He therefore sought an 
exemption from the requirement to remit Social Security taxes for his 
employees because it was religiously impermissible for him to contribute to 
such a redistribution scheme. The Court unanimously denied the exemption, 
nominally on the ground that universal participation was “essential” to 
advancing the government’s interest in the fiscal vitality of the Social Security 
system.118 As Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that was patently not the 
case. Congress had already exempted other religious employers, and “it would 
be a relatively simple matter,” Stevens explained, for Congress to extend its 
exemption, without any harm to the system, to a discrete religious community 
with its own welfare system, if the employees in question forfeited their right 
to collect benefits.119 Indeed, several years later, Congress enacted that very 
 
117. Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Secretary of the United States Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., 2016 WL 659222, at *53 (11th Cir. 2016) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
118. 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).  
119. Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring). Within the Court, there was at least some recognition 
that Chief Justice Burger’s draft majority opinion did not adequately engage with the  
points Justice Stevens was raising, and with the difference between Lee’s requested 
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religious exemption.120 The Court in Lee, however, did not consider the 
hypothetical possibility of such a tailored congressional accommodation to be a 
relevant “less restrictive means,” even though such an alternative certainly 
could have been—and was—imagined. 
That disposition in Lee made a great deal of sense. When conferral of a 
religious exemption would undermine a compelling government interest, such 
as avoiding harm to third parties, a subsequent legislature will often, in theory, 
be able to cure the problem with a statutory “fix,” especially a new 
appropriation. As Justice Ginsburg asked in her Hobby Lobby dissent, however, 
“where is the stopping point to the ‘let the government pay’ alternative?”121 If a 
new appropriations law were deemed a “less restrictive” alternative, then the 
government would virtually always have to afford exemptions, no matter how 
severe the harm to government interests, simply because Congress could in 
theory ameliorate the harm through additional taxing and spending. 
That does not describe the Court’s pre-Smith jurisprudence of “less 
restrictive means,” and it cannot be what Congress intended when it  
enacted RFRA.122 Indeed, the very prospect, or possibility, of such a regime 
undoubtedly would have doomed any prospect of RFRA’s enactment. 
conclusion 
Nothing in the Court’s actual disposition of Hobby Lobby is inconsistent 
with this understanding of RFRA and the pre-Smith jurisprudence that it 
incorporates. Indeed, the majority opinion expressly recognized that “cost may 
 
accommodation and a run-of-the-mill religious objection to paying income taxes. See 
Memorandum from Frank Holleman, Law Clerk, to Justice Blackmun, re: No. 80-767, 
United States v. Lee, at 3 (Dec. 3, 1981) (on file with the Library of Congress) (Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, box 343, folder 80-767) (Justice Blackmun making “check mark” marginal 
notation to law clerk’s observation that “it would be a much more honest opinion if the 
Court admitted that the Amish have a stronger case than do tax protestors who object to 
paying income taxes for a government service without providing the government service 
themselves”); see also Memorandum from Frank Holleman, Law Clerk, to Justice Blackmun, 
re: No. 80-767, United States v. Lee, at 2 (Jan. 15, 1982) (on file with the Library of Congress) 
(Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 343, folder 80-767) (noting that “Justice Stevens makes 
two valid points,” including that “Lee’s argument is stronger than the Chief Justice 
admits”).  
120. See Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3781 (1988) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3127). 
121. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
122. Cf. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 94 (Cal. 2004) 
(rejecting the argument that the California Legislature could more widely exempt employers 
from a contraception coverage requirement without increasing the number of affected 
women by providing public funding of contraceptives for the employees of exempted 
employers, even though the legislature had considered such a provision in an earlier version 
of the WCEA: “Catholic Charities points to no authority requiring the state to subsidize 
private religious practices.”). 
the contested legacy of religious freedom restoration 
441 
 
be an important factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis,” and that “in 
applying RFRA ‘courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.’”123  
It therefore remains an open question whether the Court will transform 
RFRA into “a bold initiative departing from, rather than restoring, pre-Smith 
jurisprudence”124—a “Religious Freedom Revolution Act,” as it were.125 If the 
Court takes that step, as some components of the old RFRA coalition are 
urging it to do, that would be a sharp and alarming break with the past—an 
outcome difficult to reconcile with the notion that the Court “must . . . respect 
the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.”126 “A 
fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative 
plan.”127 In the case of RFRA, that legislative plan was to restore, rather than to 
radically transform, the law of religious accommodations.  
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123. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 & n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 
(2005)); see also id. at 2786-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the state may not 
permit religious exercise to “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting 
their own interests” that “the law deems compelling”); id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. at 2791-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
125. See Eternal Word Television Network, 2016 WL 659222, at *50 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) 
(describing RFRA as a ”mighty bulwark, entrenching against Government incursion the 
freedom of religious liberty throughout the United States Code”). 
126. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
127. Id. 
